section 3820: “Buildings occupied | as
slicer If it had said, “Dormitories,
dining halls, and other buildings Oc-
cupied as colleges,” the meaning would
have been the same, and the amplifica-
son would have added nothing to the
precise certainty of the language used.
(State v.. Ross, 24 N. J. L. R., 497;
Northampton Co. v. Lafayett Coll., 128
Pa. St., 132; Ramsey Co. v. McAllis-
ter Coll., 51 Min., 437 Griswould Coll.
v. Iowa, 275.)
RENTING OF ROOMS DOES NOT CHANGE
iT
The fact that certain sums are paid
for the use of the rooms occupied does
not alter the character of the occupa-
tion. A church is none the less a
church because the worshippers con-
tribute to the support of services by
way of pew rent. A hospital is none
the less a hospital because the bene-
ficiaries contribute something towards
its maintenance. And a college is none
the less a college because its benefi-
ciaries share the cost of maintenance;
and it is immaterial whether such con-
tribution is lumped in one sum, or ap-
portioned to sources of expense, as
tuition, room rent, lecture fee, dining
hall, etc. ,
The defendant further claims that
even if some dormitories may be oc-
cupied as a college, yet section 3820
must be construed strictly because it is
a statute exempting property from tax-
ation, and, so construed, the finding of
the committee requires the court to
hold that the dormitories assessed are
not in fact buildings erected for the use
of students, but in substance constitute
an investment in the business of fur-
nishing apartments for rich men at
highly remunerative rates, and that the
student, as student, is in fact and by the
very necessity of the case excluded
from any ocupation of the buildings.
And therefore upon the principle laid
down in Sunday School Union v. Phil-
adelphia: “If such institution sees fit
to engage in trade, for the purpose of
increasing 1ts revenue or making any
part of its business self-supporting, the
trade part of its business can be taxed,
andought to be.” (161 Pa. St., 307, 313,
315; Cincinnati College v. The State,
19 Ohio St. 110.) Neither contention
is correct.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION.
The rule that laws exempting prop-
ety from taxation should be strictly
construed is well settled; and is based
on solid reason. But it is often re-
ferred to, and several times-in our own
reports, in cases where it has no appli-
cation and is not, in fact, applied.
(Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn., 351,
357; Brainard v. Colchester, ib., 407,
410; First Unitarian Society of Hart-
ford vy. Town of Hartford, 66 Conn.,
368, 374; Hartford v. Hartford Theo-
logical Seminary, ib., 475, 482.) The
last two cases mark the distinction inh
treating a mere charter exemption and
a statute declaring public buildings
non-taxable. The rule is limited by the
reasons which brought it about. These
are two—exception to a general rule
should be distinctly stated; private
privileges are obnoxious to the law
and must be clearly expressed. The
rule in truth is based on a presumption
of intention; the legislature ordinarily
intends its laws to apply to all equally;
it does not intend to grant privileges
to select individuals. So when excep-
tions or special privileges are claimed
under a statute, this ordinary or pre-
sumptive intention is entitled to weight,
according to the circumstances, in as-
certaining the actual intention ex-
pressed by the language used.
NOT THE EXCEPTION BUT THE RULE.
These reasons do not fully apply to
the law under discussion. The non-
taxation of public buildings is not the
exception, but the rule. he corpora-
tion, whether municipal or private,
which own and are by law charged
with the maintenance of such untaxed
buildings, are not the recipients of
special privileges in any sense obnoxi-
ous to the law. This clause of section
3820 does not exempt any individuals
from the burden of taxation that is
common to all; it does not grant to
one, particular privileges denied to all
others; it declares that lands and build-
ing sequestered to certain public uses
1. €., taken out of the body of private
property, and devoted exclusively to
wAT ic ALUMMNYT wre.
the common ood, from which no in-
dividual can derive any profit, are not
taxable property. And this has been,
not the exception, but the rule from
the foundation of our government.
The seat of government, state or muni-
cipal, highways, parks, churches, pub-
lic school houses, colleges, have never
been within the range of taxation; they
cannot be exceptions from a rule in
which they were never included.
Our theory of taxation was laid down
in code of 1650, and has not been
changed, except so far as the revenue
of estate may have become the basis of
assessment. “Every inhabitant shall
contribute to all charges both in church
and commonwealth, whereof he doth
or may receive benefit, proportionately
to his ability’—his ability to be deter-
mined by his occupation and _ the
amount of his ratable or taxable estate.
It is the person enjoying the benefits of
government who is taxed according to
his ability. The mere stuff of land and
buildings is not the subject of taxa-
tion except as it may be the source of
profit, present or prospective, to some
person bound to contribute to the
charges of government. And this same
code compelled each town to tax itself
for the support of schools that youths
might “be fitted for the university,’ and
appointed commonwealth collectors to
demand of every family gifts for the
maintenance of scholars at Cambridge.
(1 Col. Rec., pp. 547, 555.) Buildings
erected by means of such taxes and
gifts were not a source of profit to any
person; towns and trustees charged
with the maintenance of such buildings
were contributors to the public benefit
rather than recipients. So these public
buildings were not taxed; they were
not exempted, because they had not
been within the range of taxation; they
were simply not mentioned in our tax
laws.
EXEMPTIONS.
It was different with exemptions in
the more strict sense.
estates of individuals were from time to
time exempted; in 1667 those of com-
missioners or magistrates in the planta-
tions were so exempted, and a like ex-
emption was tendered Winthrop to in-
duce him to accept the appointment of
governor... (2: Gol: Rec.;-50,, 64) -in
1699 the estates of settled ministers
were exempted from paying rates, and
in 1703 the polls of students at the col-
legiate school were exempted. (4 Col.
Rec., 287, 440.) And many like exemp-
tions occur. When the legislature in
1702 adopted our statute of charitable
uses, it not only: secured the perpetua-
tion of gifts for pious uses according to
the intent of donors, but also declared
that estate so given shall be ‘free from.
payment of rates.’ This was an ex-
emption of a very wide range and
somewhat uncertain description. The
language is perhaps broad enough to
cover some public buildings which pre-
viously had been and afterwards re-
mained untaxed because of the nature
of the property and not by reasons
of special legislative exceptions; but
the main purpose of this declaration
of exemption related to productive
funds, lands or personal estate, given
for charitable uses, possibly with spe-
cial reference to the gifts of Hopkins,
Gibbons and Talcott, which had re-
cently come into use for the support
of grammar schools, to anticipated gifts
for the support of the ‘collegiate
‘school,’ and to appropriations made
for payment of ministers’ salaries. (4
Col. Rec., p. 31, Atwater v. Wood-
bridge, 6 Conn., 223, 227.) And so we
find that subsequent laws of taxation
except or exempt from payment of
rates, not only prior personal exemp-
tions, but “in like manner” all lands in
this colony sequestered to or improved
by schools and other pious uses” (8
Col. Rec., 133.), and this special ex-
emption in these words continued until
1821, when the act of 1702 was changed
by the omission of the tax exemption.
Since then the only exemption from
taxation of funds given for “pious uses”
is to be found in special charters or in
general acts passed from time to time.
PUBLIC BUILDINGS NOT INCLUDED.
But public buildings, whether be-
longing to the estate or some trustee
appointed by the state occupied as col-.
leges, school houses and churches, were
not specially named in the tax laws as
exempted because they were not in-
cluded in “ratable estate’ as taxable
property. When the legislature in 1822
The polls and.
4129
saw fit to formally declare that prop-
erty of the United States, of the state,
and of municipal governments, and
“the buildings occupied as colleges,”
etc., should be exempted from taxation
(Public acts of 1822, p. 35), it did not
alter thé character of the- property or
the reason of its not being taxed. The
declaration was not an exemption in the
strict sense of the word as to build-
ings occupied as colleges and schools
any more than as the property of the
United States. They were untaxed as
they had been for nearly 200 years,
without any legislative declaration, be-
cause they are not ‘ratable estate’; be-
cause they had been placed in that class
of property which ought not to be taxed
by virtue of a public policy too clear
to be questioned; and which had been
followed without any specific legisla-
tion by our government from its very
beginning.
THE PRINCIPLE,
The reason of such a public policy is
apparent. The principle that property
necessary for the operation of state and
municipal governments, and buildings -
occupied for those essential supports of
government—public education and pub-
lic worship—ought not to be the sub-
ject of taxation, has been with us ac-
cepted as axiomatic. It has been in-
corporated into the constitutions of
several states. It has been insepara-
bly interwoven with the structure of our
government and the habits and con-
victions of our people since 1638. It is
not based merely on the theory of the
general benefit resulting from an in-
crease of pious uses. All exemptions
imply some public benefit: otherwise
they are invalid. It is not merely an
act of grace on the part of the state.
It stands squarely on_ state -interest.
To subject all such property to taxa-
tion would tend rather to diminish than
increase the amount of taxable prop-
erty.
SERVES THE COMMON GOOD.
Other conditions being equal, the
happiness, prosperity and wealth of a
community may well be measured by
the amount of property wisely devoted
to the common good in public build-
ings, parks, highways, and buildings
occupied as colleges, school houses and
churches. To tax such property would
tend to destroy the life which produces
a constant increase of taxable property
as well as some benefits more valuable.
Tt is a misnomer to call the non-taxation
of such property an exemption in favor
of the governmental agency in whom
the legal title is vested. When se-
questered to such public use the whole
property by that act, equivalent to a
single taxation to the extent of confis-
cation—passed out of the domain of
private property, lost all value of rata-
ble estate, and became incapable of
measuring the ability of any person to
contribute to the charge of the com-
monwealth whereof he receives the
benefit.
These are in brief the positions which
the history of Connecticut shows to
have been the foundation of our taxa-
tion laws.
This clause of section 3820 is not
strictly so- much an exemption from
taxation as the declaration of a public
policy well settled and long established;
it must therefore be construed reason-
ablv so as to give full effect to the pol-
icy declared, as well as to void abuse
and frustrate evasion.
THE COMMERCIAL USE OF DORMITORIES.
The argument urged by the defend-
ant in support of its claim that the dor-
mitories assessed are practically used
for the purpose of trade, is substantially
this: The college is intended primarily
for scholars who are poor, and the
great majority of foundations express
this purpose more or less clearly; no
one shall be prevented by limitation of
birth or means from the full develop-
ment of his capacities for the service
of the state; an essential feature of the
college is equality; no special privileges
or honors can be_ secured except
through personal worth. When, there-
fore, in the apportionment of rooms,
the students are practically divided on
the right hand and left according to
the marks of wealth, and, as the finding
shows, the poor student is relegated to
the unsightly discomfort represented by
75 cents a week, and the rich student
promoted to the comparative luxury
represented by -$10 a week, a rule of
apportionment is adopted which vio-
lates the essential conditions of college
life, and the buildings or portions of
buildings appropriated to the rich stu-
dent cease to be college buildings, be-
cause the average student is excluded
from their occupation.
A REMINDER TO THE. COLLEGE AUTHORI-
ELES;
There would be force in this argu-
ment, so far as it is supported by facts,
if addressed to the College authorities.
We do not care to minimize its force
for that purpose. It goes without say- -
ing that the most costly gifts cannot
compensate for any loss of that spirit
of independent equality which is the life
of the University, and which has here-
pee especially charaterized this plain-
tit.
But the argument does not touch the
essential contention that the dormi-
tories are used for trade and not as
college buildings.. The committee
finds that these buildings “are occupied
by students of the college as study and
living rooms under the supervision and
management of college officers resident
therein for that purpose.” And that
they are “unfitted for any other use or
purpose.” And such is admittedly the
fact. This is conclusive. The criticism
of the defendant goes deeper, and
claims that the rules for ordering the
occupation of college buildings tend to
the perversion of the purpose of the
college. But the power to make these
rules is vested in the trustees by the
charter; wise or unwise, they are an
exercise of charter power. As to their
effect thus far, the committee finds that
the Corporation administers a college
within the true intent and meaning of
its charter “wherein all-such persons
of good moral character as desire to
avail themselves of its advantages, ir-
respective. of nationality, domicile,
color, creed or religious belief, are at
a moderate cost, to the number of about
2,500 annually, instructed in the arts
and sciences.” There are no special
facts found necessarily inconsistent with
this conclusion. We are not now,
therefore, called upon to decide whether
a complete perversion of college pur-
pose involves a forfeiture of college
rights.
THESE ARE EXEMPT.
All the dormitories occupied by stu-
dents, the building used as a dining
hall, the observatory buildings, the two
houses furnished by the College for the
officers of the Observatory, the adjoin-
ing land found to be reasonably neces-
sary for the purposes of the Observa-
tory, and No. 121 Elm street used as a
college yard in connection with the
College buildings, are non-taxable prop-
erty under section 3820. Some sugges-
tion was made in argument that this
section might include buildings oc-
cupied but not owned by the College;
we do not admit this interpretation,
but express no opinion, as the ques-
tion is not involved in this case. —_
Second. The act of 1834 amending
the charter of Yale College is as fol-
lows:
“That the funds which have been or
may hereafter be granted, provided by
the State of Connecticut, or given by
any person or persons to the Corpora-
tion of the President and Fellows of
Yale College in New Haven, and by
them invested and held for the use of
that institution, shall, with the interest
thereof, be and remain exempt from
taxation. Provided, however, that the
said Corporation shall never hold in
this State real estate free from taxation
affording an annual income of more
than six thousand dollars, and provided
also that the private property of the
officers of the institution shall not be
exempt from taxation and that the said
Corporation shall, on or before the first
day of September A.D., 1834, give its
assent to this act, and transmit the
evidence thereof to the Secretary of. the
State, to be by him recorded.” (Vol.
2, Priv. Laws, p. —.)
The same language in respect to tax-
atign is repeated in section 3820, which
was passed in 1882 (Special Laws,
Chap. xcviii) to exclude the charters of
colleges, which were claimed to be in
the nature of contracts, from the opera-
tion of acts affecting taxation. Some
of the considerations suggested in dis-
cussing the clause of 3820 apply to the
construction of this charter. In grant-
